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The law of conspiracy is a confused area which poses various
legal questions for judges and practitioners. Although both civil
and criminal conspiracies exist,' this Comment examines only
the Louisiana crime in terms of its common law and federal
law sources and in light of the applicable rules of criminal pro-
cedure and evidence. Some discussion of criminal attempt is
made for comparison and contrast.
COMMON LAW CONSPIRACY
Criminal conspiracy, a misdemeanor 2 of common law cre-
ation, is now generally defined by statutes as an agreement
to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by criminal or
unlawful means.4 Justification for making mere conspiracy a
crime is rooted in policy.5 The agreement itself is evil, inde-
pendent of any acts done in furtherance of it." The social harm
resulting from these agreements and combinations emanates
from the dangerous nature of group offenses, there being less
chance of abandonment of the plan when each conspirator relies
on the other's activity
By definition, there must be a combination of two or more
people." But because the gist of the crime is agreement in pur-
suance of a particular course of action,9 the accomplishment of
1. R. PERKINS, ON CRIMINAL LAW 527 (1957) (hereinafter referred to as
PERKINS); 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 1(1) (1967).
2. J. ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 4051
(35th ed. 1962) (hereinafter referred to as ARCHBOLD); W. CLARK & W. MAR-
SHALL, LAW OF CRIMES § 9.00 (7th ed. 1967) (hereinafter referred to as CLARK
& MARSHALL); PERKINS 528.
3. Note, 21 BROOKLYN L. REV. 38 (1955).
4. Justice Holmes in United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910),
coined the much quoted phrase that a conspiracy is a "partnership in crimi-
nal purpose"; State v. Slutz, 106 La. 182, 30 So. 298 (1901); CLARK & MARSHALL
§ 9.00; PERKINS 528; 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 35(1) (1967).
5. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); PERKINS 535.
6. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
7. PERKINS 535.
8. ARCHBOLD § 4051; CLARK & MARSHALL § 9.00; PERKINS 537. This combina-
tion or agreement need not be formal: it is sufficient that minds meet to
"bring about an intelligent and deliberate agreement to do the acts contem-
plated." CLARK & MARSHALL § 9.03 at 563.
9. CLARK & MARSHALL § 9.00; 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy §§ 35(1), 38 (1967).
At common law husband and wife were considered one individual and there-
fore incapable of conspiring with each other. This is no longer true.
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the object of the agreement is not essential.1 0 At common law,
in fact, no overt act was needed to complete the crime." It is
even immaterial that any or all of the parties are incapable
of committing the crime which forms its object.12
The law imputes' 8 to all conspirators the acts of each in
furtherance of the conspiracy. 14 It is not necessary that the act
be made in the presence of another conspirator.' Likewise,
it is unnecessary that all parties enter the conspiracy at the same
time.16 Those entering late assume responsibility for all prior
acts done in furtherance of the common objective. 7
A twofold specific intent is required:' 8 to combine with
others, and to do what is unlawful. There must be a meeting
of the minds and a unity of design or purpose to satisfy the
intent element. 9 It is not required, however, that the con-
spirator know the full scope of the conspiracy; he is held for
any acts committed in furtherance of its object, even without
knowledge of details of the plan, of manner of execution" or of
parties involved.2 ' If no party has knowledge that the objective
is unlawful, the parties cannot be guilty of a conspiracy, for
there would be no requisite intent;22 there can be no conspiracy
when only one party has knowledge that its object is unlawful
because there is no combined intent to do what is unlawful.
23
Further, mere knowledge of the existence of a conspiracy among
others is not enough to make one a party to it 24 because there is
no specific intent to enter the agreement to aid in accomplishing
its design.25
10. CLARK & MARSHALL § 9.00; PERKINS 530; 15 C.J.S. Conspiracy §§ 35(1),
44 (1967).
11. State v. D'Ingianni, 217 La. 945, 47 So.2d 731 (1950); PERKINS 531;
15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 43(1) (1967). This is still the law where unchanged
by statute.
12. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78 (1915); ARCHBOLD § 4052;




16. CLARK & MARSHALL § 9.03. This differs from an accessory after the
fact who does not become a participant until after the commission of the
offense and who is not a party to the agreement. See LA. R.S. 14:25 (1950).
17. PERKINS 399.







24. 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 39 (1967).
25. Id.
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The common law definition of conspiracy specifies that the
object need not be criminal. To constitute the crime it is suffi-
cient that the aim be unlawful, for example, civil injury or
wrong.26 Specific examples of unindictable offenses2 which may
form the object of conspiracy are those contrary to public morals
as prostitution or marrying under a false name28 and conspiracies
to pervert or obstruct justice.29 General classifications of indict-
able criminal conspiracies at common law include conspiracies
to: (1) commit any offense punishable by law,8 (2) cheat and
defraud,81 (3) injure an individual by wrongful acts other than
fraud,3 2 (4) prevent, obstruct, pervert, or defeat justice,83 (5)
affect trade,34 (6) do immoral acts,35 and (7) maliciously im-
poverish or ruin a third person.36
The conspiracy continues until consummated, abandoned, or
otherwise terminated by some affirmative act.31 It does not
always end with the accomplishment of the substantive crime
forming the object, for the scope of the agreement determines
its duration.88 At common law there were no prescriptive periods
for crimes.3 9 and the point of cessation of the conspiracy was
not of as great import as today. Separate agreements constitute
separate conspiracies,40 and a single agreement remains only
one conspiracy even though it contemplates several offenses.
41
The addition, substitution, or withdrawal of members of the
conspiracy does not change the number of conspiracies involved
nor does it affect the status of the remaining members.42
26. ARCHBOLD § 4051; CLARK & MARSHALL § 9.04; 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 42
(1967).
27. PERKINS 540.
28. ARCHBOLD § 4056; CLARK & MARSHALL § 9.04.
29. CLARK & MARSHALL § 9.04.
30. CLARK & MARSHALL § 9.04; ARCHBOLD § 4052.
31. See note 30 supra.
32. See note 30 supra.
33. ARCHBOLD § 4052.
34. ARCHBOLD § 4052; CLARK & MARSHALL § 9.04.
35. CLARK & MARSHALL § 9.04.
36. CLARK & MARSHALL § 9.04; State v. Buchanan, 5 Am. Dec. 317 (Md.
Ct. App. 1821).
37. CLARK & MARSHALL § 9.08; 15A C.J.S. CONSPIRACY § 35(2) (1967).
38. If, for example, division of proceeds in a conspiracy to rob is part
of the agreement, this would extend this conspiracy further in time. 15A
C.J.S. Conspiracy § 35(2) (1967).
39. CLARK & MARSHALL § 52; Note, 20 LA. L. REv. 426 (1960); 15 Am. J.
CR. L. § 342 (1938).
40. 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 42 (1967).
41. PERKINS 529-30.
42. CLARK & MARSHALL § 9.02.
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MODERN FEDERAL CONSPIRACY
The federal conspiracy law was drawn from this general
common law background.43
"If two or more persons conspire either to commit any
offense against the United States, or to defraud the United
States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any pur-
pose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect
the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
"If, however, the offense, the commission of which is
the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only the
punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maxi-
mum punishment provided for such misdemeanor."44
Although the cases show that conspiracy is not a well-defined
crime,43 authorities agree that it is a separate and distinct offense
from that which may result from its consummation. 4 Proof of
one, therefore, is not proof of the other.47 The federal crime of
conspiracy is similar to the common law crime in that the object
of the conspiracy may be any offense. It need not be an object
indictable at law.48 Those crimes which require two or more
necessary parties for completion-i.e., bigamy and adultery-
cannot be the object of a conspiracy when only those necessary
parties participate. However, nothing prevents two persons from
conspiring with a third to commit these usual two-party crimes.49
Unlike the common law, under the federal conspiracy law today
a husband and wife may conspire.5 Since the federal conspiracy
is a separate and distinct offense, conspirators who accomplish
an indictable objective may be prosecuted for either thecon-
43. ARCHBOLD § 4071.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
45. Note, ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 31 (1945).
46. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Pinker-
ton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); Jordan v. United States, 380 F.2d
126 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1033 (1967); Notes, 21 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 39 (1954), 21 BROOKLYN L. REV. 43 (1954), 20 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 34
(1945).
47. Jordan v. United States, 370 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1033 (1967).
48. PERKINS 543.
49. United States v. Loew, 145 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 840 (1945); United States v. Zeuli, 137 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1943). See also
Note, 21 BROOKLYN L. REV. 40 (1954).
50. See note 49 supra.
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spiracy or the offense forming its object, or both,51 and there
may be conviction for one without conviction for the other.5 2
It is possible for various members of the conspiracy to have
different roles and different motives.53 As at common law, knowl-
edge of the entire scheme by a conspirator is not necessary for
liability to attach.5 4 Further, in accord with common law, those
joining an already existing conspiracy become liable for all prior
conduct of co-conspirators. 5 Such late-comers cannot, however,
be convicted of substantive crimes committed prior to their
entry.56 All conspirators are responsible for the acts and declara-
tions of any member of the conspiracy when such act or declara-
tion is in furtherance of the combination.57
The feature which most distinguishes the federal from the
common law crime is the modern requirement of some "act to
effect the object of the conspiracy. ' '58 Therefore, the federal crime
is more than just an agreement; it is not until the overt act is
accomplished that the conspiracy becomes complete.59 The overt
act itself need not be criminal.6 0 It may be the act of any single
conspirator or any combination of conspirators."' "[I]t becomes
clear that on the federal level, at least, the overt act need only
be of comparatively slight qualitative and quantitative propor-
tions."6 2
The duration of the conspiracy depends on the particular
facts,6 3 but basically is governed by the scope of the agreement.
6 4
For one to end his participation in the conspiracy, there must
be some affirmative action on his part communicated to another
51. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); United States v. Bazel,
187 F.2d 878 (7th Cir. 1951).
52. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78 (1915).
53. United States v. Hoffa, 367 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1966), vacated on other
grounds, 387 U.S. 231 (1967).
54. United States v. Luxenberg, 374 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1967).
55. Gradsky v. United States, 376 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1967); United States
v. Bucur, 194 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1952); United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834
(2d Cir. 1938).
56. Gradsky v. United States, 376 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1967).
57. PERKINS 547.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1948). See also Jones v. United States, 365 F.2d 87
(10th Cir. 1966); Note, 21 BROOKLYN L. REV. 41-42 (1954). But not all federal
crimes require an overt act, and to that extent are much closer to the
common law notion. Note, 37 HARV. L. REv. 1122 (1923).
59. Note, 21 BROOKLYN L. REV. 41 (1954).
60. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78 (1915).
61. Note, 21 BROOKLYN L. REV. 41 (1954).
62. CLARK & MARSHALL § 9.00, at 554.
63. Woodring v. United States, 367 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1966).
64. United States v. Hickey, 360 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1966).
(Vol. xxlrIII
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conspirator. It is not enough that he merely withdraw his
consent.
6 5
The federal rules permit joining the conspiracy and the
crime which forms its object in the same indictment .1 Venue for
conspiracy is any federal district where the agreement was
entered into or where any overt act in furtherance of the con-
spiracy occurred.6 7 The statute of limitations on federal con-
spiracy is three years6 8 from the date of the last overt act, the
date the conspiracy succeeds, or the date the conspiracy is
abandoned. 9 Since the crime of conspiracy is secretive in nature
and discovering the crime is difficult, the courts leniently apply
statutes of limitation and give the conspiracy the broadest pos-
sible scope in time.70
LOUISIANA CONSPIRACY
Until 1940 the general crime of conspiracy was not to be
found in Louisiana legislation.7 1 There were, however, specific
statutes which made criminal combinations to commit certain
felonies.7 2 In 1940, the Louisiana legislature passed Act 16, which
denounced and punished conspiracies to commit "any offense
against the state" or to defraud the state, its subdivisions, or
institutions."3 The legislature in 1942 promulgated the Criminal
Code which included in article 26 the present general conspiracy
65. United States v. McGuire, 249 F. Supp. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
66. FED. R. C0M. P. 8(a); United States v. Jones, 374 F.2d 414 (2d Cir.
1967).
67. United States v. Hinton, 268 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. La. 1967); Note, 21
BROOKLYN L. REV. 46 (1954).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1948)
69. Fiserick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946); United States v. Cohen,
145 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944); Brown v. Elliott, 225 U.S. 392 (1912); United States
v. Hyde, 225 U.S. 347 (1912); Note, 21 BROOKLYN L. REV. 46 (1954).
70. Note, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1472 (1954).
71. Bugea, Lazarus & Pegues, The Louisiana Legislation of 1940, 3 LA.
L. REV. 98 (1940).
72. LA. R.S. 14:26 comment (History and Present Scope) (1950); Bugea,
Lazarus, & Pegues, The Louisiana Legislation of 1940--111. Matters Pertawn-
ing to Criminal Law and Procedure, 3 LA. L. REV. 98, 157 n.49 (1940).
73. The phrase "any offense against the State" is ambiguous and leads
to two interpretations. "Offenses" may mean all offenses made criminal by
statutes, or may mean conspiracies designed to injure the state. It is sug-
gested, however, that this distinction is misleading. Acts are made criminal
by statute because interests of society condemn them as injurious to society
as a whole or to individuals within the society. And since the state is com-
posed of these individuals, their interests are also those of the state. An
offense against the individual is therefore also an offense against the state.
Bugea, Lazarus, & Pegues, The Louisiana Legislat4on of 1940, 3 LA. L. REv.
98 (1940).
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law. It was based on the 1940 general conspiracy statute74 and
on the Federal Conspiracy Statute.75
"Criminal conspiracy is the agreement or combination of
two or more persons for the specific purpose of committing
any crime; provided that an agreement or combination to
commit a crime shall not amount to a criminal conspiracy
unless, in addition to such agreement or combination, one
or more of such parties does an act in furtherance of the
object of the agreement or combination.
"Where the intended basic crime has been consummated
the conspirators may be tried for either the conspiracy or
the completed offense, and a conviction for one shall not bar
a prosecution for the other. . .. "TO
The concept of a criminal conspiracy has been a useful tool
for law enforcement. 7 It enables prosecution of individuals who
have united in criminal purpose before they actually commit
the offense. In an instance where there is difficulty of proof
that the crime which forms the object of the conspiracy was
committed, the statute increases the likelihood of conviction by
permitting prosecution for a lesser crime.78
As at common law and under the federal statute, article
26 of the Louisiana Criminal Code expressly provides that the
crime of conspiracy is a separate and distinct offense from the
crime which forms its object. 9 And although it is listed in the
Criminal Code under inchoate offenses, it is a completed offense
in itself.0 Unlike the crime which is its object, conspiracy re-
quires combination or agreement of purpose."' Consequently,
conviction for conspiracy or for the completed object of the
conspiracy will not bar a conviction for the other.
8 2
74. Bennett, The Louisiana Criminal Code, 5 LA. L. REV. 6 (1942).
75. State v. D'Ingianni, 217 La. 945, 47 So.2d 731 (1950); 18 U.S.C. § 88
(1940).
76. LA. R.S. 14:26 (1950).
77. Id. comment (History and Present Scope); Bennett, The Louisiana
Criminal Code, 5 LA. L. REv. 6 (1942).
78. LA. R.S. 14:26 (1950).
79. Id. comment (Conspiracy Distinct from Basic Offense) (1950); State
v. Bagneris, 237 La. 21, 110 So.2d 123 (1959); State v. Gunter, 180 La. 145, 156
So. 203 (1934); Bennett, The Louisiana Criminal Code, 5 LA. L. REv. 6 (1942).
80. State v. Fernandez, 157 La. 149, 102 So. 186 (1924).
81. LA. R.S. 14:26 comment (The Overt Act) (1950); Bennett, The Lou-
isiana Criminal Code, 5 LA. L. REv. 138 (1942); Note, 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 138
(1940).
82. LA. R.S. 14:26 and comment (Conspiracy Distinct From Basic Offense)
(1950); State v. Gunter, 180 La. 145, 156 So.2d 203 (1934).
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At common law the object of the conspiracy must be either
unlawful or its means of accomplishment must be unlawful.
Under the federal statute the object must only be an "offense."
The Louisiana Code specifies a further refinement: the object
of the conspiracy must be a statutory crime.83
Specific intent is required for a conspiracy. However, specific
knowledge that the acts planned are criminal 'is not neces-
sary,8 4 and it is sufficient that the parties specifically intended
conduct which was, in fact, criminal. The essence of the con-
spiracy is still the agreement and combination of two or more
peopleS5-a plot or design,8 6 a "breathing together" for a common
criminal purpose.8 7
Under the federal law and under article 26 an overt act in
furtherance of the object 88 is added to the common law requisites
for completion of the conspiracy. 9 It becomes a condition pre-
cedent to conspiratorial responsibility.90 The overt act is required
to provide a locus poenitentiae, a point before which the parties
may abandon their plan and avoid the penalty, 91 and to guar-
antee the genuineness of the criminal combination by precluding
prosecution if the offense is still in the talking stage.9 2 The overt
act in Louisiana has been described in general and vague terms.
No specific guidelines have been drawn to determine which
acts are sufficient, and cases in point are few. It is said that an
83. LA. R.S. 14:26 (1950); State ex reZ. Sanchez v. Smith, 207 La. 735, 21
So.2d 890 (1945); State v. Clement, 194 La. 394, 193 So. 685 (1940); State v.
Fontenot, 112 La. 628, 36 So. 630 (1904). Statutes in other states are similar;
some are variations which include acts injurious to public health and acts
to pervert justice in addition to the statutory crimes. PERKINS 541.
84. LA. R.S. 14:26 and comment (Specific Intent Required) (1950); Ben-
nett, The Louisiana Criminal Code, 5 LA. L. REV. 6 (1942).
85. United States v. Frisbie, 28 F. 808 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 157 U.S. 160 (1886);
State v. D'Ingianni, 217 La. 945, 47 So.2d 731 (1950); State v. Slutz, 106 La.
182, 30 So. 298 (1901).
86. O'Malley v. Whittaker, 118 La. 906, 43 So. 545 (1907).
87. United States v. Frisbie, 28 F. 808 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 157 U.S. 160 (1886).
88. CLARK & MARSHALL § 9.00; PERKINS 532.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964); LA. R.S. 14:26 and comment (The Overt Act)
(1950); State v. D'Ingianni, 217 La. 945, 47 So.2d 731 (1950).
90. CLARK & MARSHALL § 9.00; PERKINS 532.
91. United States v. Olmstead, 5 F.2d 712, 714 (W.D. Wash. 1925), citing
United States v. Britton, 108 U.S. 192 (1882), and Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62
(1905).
92. The overt act in the Louisiana crime was taken from the federal
conspiracy statute. In a dissent, Justice Holmes said the federal overt act
requirement is no more a part of the conspiracy than it was at common law.
He felt it is merely evidence of the fact that the conspiracy "had passed
beyond words and is on foot when the overt act is done." Hyde v. United
States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912). See also The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1950-1951 Term-Criminal Law, 12 LA. L. REv. 125, 128 (1952);
Bennett, The Louisiana Criminal Code, 5 LA. L. REv. 6, 20 (1942).
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overt act is one capable of being observed by someone else.93
It need not be unlawful, and may be an otherwise innocent act
which furthers a criminal objective.94 It is not the same overt
act required for an attempt, for it does not require the same
"nearness to the completion of the offense that is required for
an attempt."9 5 Approaching a house and disturbing the inhabi-
tants therein is an overt act in a conspiracy to abduct for the
purpose of sexual intercourse. 96 In State v. D'Ingianni97 the
court listed sufficient overt acts as: (1) a car trip in furtherance
of conspirator's object, (2) the transfer and delivery of a car
to be used to dispose of jewels, (3) the transporting of a co-
conspirator from the highway to his home, (4) the removal of
initials on the stolen jewelry so as to make it unidentifiable,
(5) the delivery of jewelry, and (6) the departure from town
to dispose of stolen goods. Other acts sufficient to qualify are
taking position to observe acts of intended kidnap victims and
buying stamps to mail poison through the mails." It can be seen
that very little is required to meet the overt act requirement
of a conspiracy. It is not necessary, of course, for all conspirators
to act. All are liable for the acts of the others done in furtherance
of the plan.99
The accomplishment of the crime forming the object of the
conspiracy does not necessarily end the conspiracy. It continues
until the scope of the plan is accomplished. In an instance,
therefore, when plans for a robbery include later division of the
proceeds, the conspiracy endures until the division is made.1' °
If conspirators contemplate everything necessary for escape, a
murder by a co-conspirator during the escape will make all
responsible; but if the murder is the result of a situation where
there was no agreement, the co-conspirator will not be liable. 10 '
93. Stallybrass, A Comparison of the General Principles of Criminal Law
4n England with the "Progetto Definitivo di un nuovo codice penale" of
Alfredo Rocco, in THE MODERN APPROACH TO CRIMINAL LAW (1945).
94. Marino v. United States, 91 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1937); State v. D'Ingian-
ni, 217 La. 945, 47 So.2d 731 (1950).
95. State v. D'Ingianni, 217 La. 945, 47 So.2d 731 (1950); PERKINS 533;
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1950-1951 Term-Criminal
Law, 12 LA. L. REV. 125, 128 (1952).
96. State v. Courtney, 170 La. 314, 127 So. 735 (1930).
97. 217 La. 945, 47 So.2d 731 (1950) (conspirary to commit theft).
98. PERKINS 533.
99. PERKINS 533; State v. Courtney, 170 La. 314, 127 So. 735 (1930); State
v. Green, 7 La. Ann. 518 (1852).
100. State v. Taylor, 173 La. 1010, 139 So. 463, cert. denied, 285 U.S. 547
(1931); State v. Bolden, 109 La. 484, 33 So. 571 (1903).
101. State v. Taylor, 173 La. 1010, 139 So. 463, cert. denied, 285 U.S. 547
(1931).
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For a conspirator to end his responsibility he must not only
withdraw but also communicate his withdrawal to the co-con-
spirators.102
LOUISIANA ATTEMPTS
Before the Criminal Code there was no general crime of
attempt.1 3 Article 27 replaces various scattered statutes by mak-
ing it an offense to attempt any statutory crime.
"Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a
crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of and tending
directly toward the accomplishing of its object is guilty of
an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be
immaterial whether, under the circumstances he would
have actually accomplished his purpose.
. "Mere preparation to commit a crime shall not be suffi-
cient to constitute an attempt; but lying in wait with a
dangerous weapon with the intent to commit a crime, or
searching for the intended victim with a dangerous wea-
pon with the intent to commit a crime, shall be sufficient
to constitute an attempt to commit the offense intended.
"An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended
crime; and any person may be convicted of an attempt to
commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the
crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by
such persons in pursuance of such attempt."' 0 4
Although attempt and conspiracy are listed together under
the heading of inchoate crimes, the two are expressly different.
Conspiracy is a separate and distinct crime and not part of the
crime which forms its object. On the contrary, an attempt is a
lesser grade of the same crime which forms its object.10 5
The elements of the attempt are: (1) specific intent to
commit the particular crime and (2) an overt act done "for the
purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishment of
102. Id.
103. LA. R.S. 14:27 comment (Louisiana Statutes Covered) (1950); Ben-
nett, The Louisiana Criminal Code, 5 LA. L. REV. 6 (1942).
104. LA. R.S. 14:27 (1950). The source for this article was the Canadian
Criminal Code. Id. comment (Specific Intent Important Element).
105. State v. Sercovich, 246 La. 503, 165 So.2d 301 (1964); LA. R.S. 14:26,
14:27 (1950); Comment, 7 LA. L. REV. 127 (1946).
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[its] object." 106 It is different from a conspiracy in that the addi-
tional element of a combination or agreement is not necessary."1 7
Also, mere preparatory acts, though sufficient to constitute the
overt act of a conspiracy, are expressly insufficient to constitute
an attempt.'4 8
At common law there could be no prosecution for an attempt
if the crime itself is completed, 09 for failure is an essential
element of the attempt.110 Louisiana has abandoned this notion,
and today under the attempt statute, there can be prosecution
for an attempt even when the crime is completed."' The attempt
article also rejects the common law doctrine which permits
as a defense"12 the impossibility of completion. The ability of
the person to commit the crime is immaterial.1 8
Because the element of specific intent is essential to an
attempt, there are some crimes, negligent homicide,1 4 for
example, which cannot be the object of an attempt. 115 Neither
can there be an attempted manslaughter under article 31(2)
of the Criminal Code,116 as no intent is required for this so-
106. LA. R.S. 14:27 and comment (Specific Intent Important Element and
The Overt Act) (1950); State v. Porter, 249 La. 784, 191 So.2d 498 (1966);
State v. Murff, 215 La. 40, 39 So.2d 817 (1949); State v. Carter, 213 La. 829,
35 So.2d 747 (1948); State v. Roberts, 213 La. 559, 35 So.2d 216 (1948); State
v. Ferrand, 210 La. 394, 27 So.2d 174 (1946); Bennett, The Louisiana Criminal
Code, 5 LA. L. REV. 6 (1942); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for
the 1958-1954 Term-Criminal Law and Procedure, 15 LA. L. REV. 348 (1955);
Note, 8 LA. L. REV. 282 (1948).
107. Bennett, The Louisiana Criminal Code, 5 LA. L. REV. 6 (1942).
108. 108. Id.; LA. R.S. 14:26, 27 (1950).
109. Comment, 7 LA. L. REV. 127 (1946).
110. LA. R.S. 14:27 comment (Failure not Essential Element of Attempt)
(1950).
111. LA. R. S. 14:27 (1950); State v. Sercovich, 246 La. 503, 165 So.2d 301
(1964); Notes, 15 LA. L. REV. 826 (1955), 21 TUL. L. REV. 281 (1946).
112. LA. R.S. 14:27 comment (Specific Intent Important Element) (1950);
Note, 15 LA L. REV. 826 (1955).
113. LA. R.S. 14:27 comment (Specific Intent Important Element) (1950);
Note, 15 LA. L. REV. 826 (1955). Writers recognize a distinction between legal
and factual impossibility. Legal impossibility exists when one would not be
guilty of any crime even if his plans were effectuated. Examples of legal
impossibility are a husband's raping his wife or one allegedly receiving
stolen goods where no goods were stolen. Physical impossibility results
where the particular individual is incapable of committing the crime. An
example is an impotent person attempting a rape. Such a distinction has not
yet been applied in Louisiana, but its acceptance elsewhere might be influen-
tial. Notes, 26 LA. L. REv. 426 (1966), 29 TUL. L. REV. 149 (1954).
114. State v. Adams, 210 La. 782, 28 So.2d 269 (1946); The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term-Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure, 8 LA L. REV. 282 (1948).
115. There is no such crime as attempted conspiracy. The courts refuse
to apply the principle of the inchoate crime of attempt to other inchoate
crimes. Note, 9 LA. L. REV. 413 (1949).
116. LA. R.S. 14:31 (1950): "Manslaughter is: . . . (2) a homicide com-
mitted, without any intent to cause death or great bodily harm . . ."
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called "involuntary manslaughter" clause. On the contrary, there
may be an attempted manslaughter under article 31(1) 117 of
the Code, as "voluntary manslaughter" involves the element of
intent. Negligence or constructive intent does not satisfy the
requisite specific intent.118 The test suggested by the Reporter's
Comment to determine specific intent is whether the defendant
would have been guilty of a crime if his intention had been fully
consummated. 119 Direct evidence of this specific intent is not
necessary and is frequently unavailable; specific intent may be
deduced from circumstantial evidence. For example, intent to
murder may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon.12
The overt act in an attempt must tend toward the accom-
plishment of the crime, but it must also be more than mere
preparation. 1 2 1 The difference between the mere preparation and
the overt act sufficient for an attempt is the nearness to com-
pletion; 122 it must be nearer in degree than required for the overt
act in a conspiracy. 23 The overt act should be "something ap-
proximately connected with-fairly close to-the final conse-
quence intended but not fulfilled. '124 Generally mere solicitation
of another to commit a crime is not an act near enough to com-
pletion of the crime to constitute an attempt. However, solicita-
tion is very close to the crime and is sufficient for an attempt in
two-party crimes such as carnal knowledge of a juvenile and
abortion. 25 Whether or not the action taken has gone far enough
to constitute an attempt is usually a question of fact for the
jury. 126 However, certain situations are specially treated in the
Louisiana Criminal Code. The attempt article states that lying
117. Id.: "Manslaughter is: (1) a homicide which would be murder under
subdivision (1) of Article 30 (murder), but the offense is committed in sud-
den passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient
to deprive an average person of his self control and cool reflection. Provoca-
tion shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the
offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would
have cooled, at the time the offense was committed ......
118. Id. 14:27 comment (Specific Intent Important Element).
119. State v. Harper, 205 La. 228, 17 So.2d 260 (1944).
120. LA. R.S. 14:27 comment (The Overt Act) (1950).
121. State v. D'Ingianni, 217 La. 945, 47 So.2d 731 (1950); State v. Pollard,
215 La. 655, 41 So.2d 465 (1949); LA. R. S. 14:27 and comment (The Overt
Act) (1950).
122. La. R.S. 14:27 comment (The Overt Act) (1950).
123. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1950-1951 Term-
Criminal Law, 12 LA. L. REv. 128 (1952).
124. Shilton, The Requisite Act in Criminal Attempt, 3 U. PrrT. L. REv.
308 (1937). See also LA. R.S. 14:27 comment (The Overt Act) (1950).
125. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1947-1948 Term-
Criminal Law and Procedure, 9 LA. L. REv. 247 (1949).
126. State v. Carter, 213 La. 829, 35 So.2d 747 (1948).
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in wait with a deadly weapon with intent to commit a crime
and searching for a victim with a deadly weapon are sufficient
for an attempt. In addition, article 54 of the Criminal Code 12
makes placing combustibles or explosives near any structure,
watercraft, or movable with specific intent eventually to set fire
in an attempt to commit arson.
An attempt is a responsive verdict for most crimes, since it
is a lesser degree of the same crime with no elements differ-
ent.'2- The Code of Criminal Procedure has eliminated the
responsive verdict "guilty of attempt" in specific instances where
it would otherwise be available129 in order to promote trial
convenience and to avoid jury confusion.
LOUISIANA PROCEDURE
Early common law indictments were limited to a single
charge, but this was later changed.1' Louisiana has come full
circle; Code of Criminal Procedure article 493 follows the early
common law approach' 3 ' in specifying that no indictment shall
charge more than one offense. This is to prevent prejudice to
the defendant, for the jury is likely to use the evidence adduced
to prove one offense to convict for another. 132 Thus it is not
possible in the same indictment to charge alleged conspirators
with the conspiracy and the completed and separate crime which
forms its object. Although two persons are required for a con-
spiracy, one may be indicted alone, provided the indictment
charges that another known or unknown person was involved. 3 3
Failure to allege any essential element of the crime, such as the
127. LA. R.S. 14:54 (1950): "The placing of any combustible or explosive
material in or near any structure, water craft, or movable, with the specific
intent eventually to set fire to such structure, water craft, or movable, an
attempt to commit arson within the meaning of the attempt article of this
Code ......
128. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 814, 815 (1966); Comment, 7 LA. L. REv. 127
(1946).
129. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 814, 815 (1966); State v. Broadnax, 216 La.
1003, 45 So.2d 604 (1950).
130. LA. CODE CIM. P. art. 493, comment (c) (1966); Slovenko, The Accusa-
tion in Louisiana Criminal Law, 32 TUL. L. REv. 47 (1957).
131. See La. Acts 1928, No. 2, § 1, La. Code Crim. P. art. 217 (1928).
132. LA. CODE CRiM. P. art. 493, comment (a) (1966); Slovenko, The
Accusation in Louisiana Criminal Law, 32 TUL. L. REV. 47 (1957). There are
exceptions to this, however. Article 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
permits charging theft and receiving stolen goods In one indictment as
well as charging manslaughter and abortion together. Article 481 permits
charging several counts of theft in the same indictment.
133. State v. Slutz, 106 La. 182, 30 So. 298 (1901).
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overt act, results in a fatally defective indictment.13 4 Inclusion
in the indictment of the manner in which the overt act tends to
further the object of the conspiracy is not necessary. 3 5 The
defense of double jeopardy once created a problem; 36 but since
a conspiracy and its object are recognized as separate and dis-
tinct crimes, prosecution for one is not a successful defense to
prosecution for the other.'3 7
As at common law,' 38 criminal venue is the district in which
the offense is committed. 3 9 When there is agreement in one
parish and an overt act in another, the offense is deemed to
have been committed in any parish where such act or element
occurred. 140 Consequently venue for a conspiracy is any parish
in which a combination, agreement, or overt act takes place.1
4 1
Members of a conspiracy can be charged jointly since they
are alleged to have committed the same offense. 142 The defen-
dants may be tried separately if, on motion of the defendant and
after contradictory hearing, the court is satisfied that justice
requires severance. 143 Separate trials are not a matter of right.144
The Code of Criminal Procedure in article 572 provides time
limitations on institution of prosecution which increase with the
gravity of the crime. The penalties for conspiracy vary with the
penalty for the crime which forms its object.145 Consequently
time limits on prosecution for conspiracy may range from six
months for misdemeanors, punishable by fine or forfeiture, to
six years for felonies necessarily punishable by imprisonment.14
134. State v. George, 247 La. 333, 170 So.2d 861 (1965); State v. Clement,
194 La. 395, 193 So. 685 (1940).
135. State v. D'Ingianni, 217 La. 945, 47 So.2d 731 (1950).
136. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 594, comment (a) (1966).
137. State v. Calvo, 240 La. 75, 121 So.2d 244 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
882 (1960).
138. Bugea, Lazarus & Pegues, The Louisiana Legislation of 1940-Ill.
Matters Pertaining to Criminal Law and Procedure, 3 LA. L. REV. 98, 157
n.49 (1940).
139. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9; State v. Smith, 194 La. 1015, 195 So. 523 (1940).
140. LA. CODE Cram. P. art. 611 (1966): "All trials shall take place in the
parish where the offense has been committed, unless the venue is changed.
If acts constituting an offense or if the elements of an offense occurred in
more than one place, in or out of the parish or state, the offense is deemed
to have been committed in any parish in this state in which any such act or
element occurred."
141. Id.; Comment, 15 LA. L. REV. 757 (1955).
142. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 494 (1966).
143. Id. art. 704.
144. Id. arts. 494, 704; State v. La Rocca, 168 La. 204, 121 So. 744 (1929);
State v. Gresham, 132 La. 594, 61 So. 681 (1913).




Time limitations pose a special problem with regard to con-
spiracies: when does the time period begin to run? A con-
spiracy may exist for years and because of its secretive nature
be undetectable. The new Code of Criminal Procedure discards
the earlier test which started time limitation running when
knowledge of the offense becomes known to the prosecutor's
office. 147 It now runs from the commission of the offense. Prob-
lems here are apparent. For example, if there is an agreement,
followed by an overt act, followed by the full prescriptive period,
followed by commission of the crime which forms its object,
is prosecution for conspiracy barred? The Code is not clear on
this point. It is submitted that the answer might lie in con-
sidering conspiracy a continuing offense, which lasts at least
until the last known act committed in furtherance of the con-
spiracy and until that time, fictitiously interrupts the running
of the time limitation.
In State v. Skinner,148 defendants indicted for illegal pos-
session and sale of narcotics objected to the jury's being
instructed on conspiracy. The Louisiana Supreme Court on first
hearing said the charge was in error. On rehearing, the court
reversed and found the charge proper, holding that an indictment
charging two or more persons necessarily involved a conspiracy.
This problem requires a clear analysis of the nature of
conspiracy, for there could be far reaching implications from the
court's statement that "where an indictment charges that the
crime was committed by two or more persons . . . [it] neces-
sarily involves a conspiracy.' 1 49 It is true that where several
persons jointly commit a crime they also may be guilty of a
conspiracy to commit that crime. However, it does not follow
that the indictment which charges the basic offense committed
by multiple defendants necessarily includes the charge of con-
spiracy. On the contrary, to charge both in a single indictment
would constitute a misjoinder under the rule of article 493 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. 50 This necessarily follows from
the fact that conspiracy is a separate and distinct crime requir-
ing the additional element of agreement, and it is only incidental
to the charge of the basic offense against multiple defendants
147. Id.
148. 251 La. 300, 204 So.2d 370 (1967).
149. 204 So.2d at 393 (La. 1967).
150. LA. CODE CRiM. P. art. 493 (1966): "No indictment shall charge more
than one offense, except as otherwise provided in this title, but the same
offense may be charged in different ways in several counts."
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that it includes factual allegations sufficient to sustain a con-
spiracy charge or that evidence at trials tends to show conspiracy.
Unlike attempt, the crime of conspiracy is not a lesser degree
of the crime charged nor is it a responsive verdict to the basic
crime allegedly committed by multiple defendants. A verdict
of "guilty of conspiracy" is only responsive to an indictment
charging conspiracy, and no jury charge on conspiracy should
be allowed if the jury cannot find the defendants guilty of that
separate crime.
The problem arises when evidence of an agreement or com-
bination is adduced at a trial of multiple defendants to prove
joint responsibility, though not all were actively engaged in
carrying out its design. It would seem that the clearest and most
logical method of giving the jury a basis for finding all defen-
dants guilty is for the court to charge the jurors with the law
on principals, not on conspiracy. A principal is any person con-
nected with the commission of a crime, present or absent, directly
or indirectly.' It is hoped that Skinner will not be construed
to require a charge on conspiracy in every case where there are
multiple defendants who may have combined in and are jointly
responsible for the commission of the crime charged.
LOUISIANA EVIDENCE
The general rules of evidence relating to crimes are not
peculiar with regard to conspiracies. One provision particularly
applicable to conspiracy specifies:
"Each co-conspirator is deemed to assent to or to com-
mend whatever is said or done in furtherance of the com-
mon enterprise, and it is therefore of no moment that such
act was done or such declaration was made out of the
presence of the conspirator sought to be bound thereby, or
whether the conspirator by doing such act or making such
declaration be or be not on trial with his co-defendant. But
to have this effect, a prima facie case of conspiracy must
have been established."'152
This statement is in general accord with evidence principles
151. LA. R.S. 14:24 (1950): "All persons concerned in the commission of
a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the
act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or
indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals."
152. Id. 15:455 (1967).
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in other jurisdictions. 153 Admissions of persons with the same
interest and the same motive and means for obtaining knowl-
edge will generally receive the same treatment by the law;
it seems sound that one charged with the acts of another be
subject to evidence which the other has provided. 5 4 Since the
act of one conspirator is imputed to all by law, acts of all parties
during the conspiracy are admissible against the others.15 5 This
is true even when conspirators are tried separately.'- One's
acts and declarations after the conspiracy has been consummated
or abandoned, however, are not admissible in evidence against
the others.157 Such statements or acts can affect only the one
making or doing them.5 8 It does not matter that such state-
ments or acts were made or done outside the presence of the
other conspirators'59 or in a different parish. 60 Likewise, overt
acts other than the one alleged in the charge may be introduced
as evidence of an intent or plan.'6 ' The problem in determining
admissibility is usually deciding at what point in time the acts
and declarations occurred, for only that said or done during the
existence of the conspiracy is admissible. When the conspiracy
is effected by acts. of a mob, statements of any members of the
mob are proper evidence. 6 2 Such utterances form an exception
to the hearsay rule as statements of intent and motive.16 3
A problem arises in determining whether the "prima facie"
case required by the statute has been established so that evi-
dence of acts and declarations of co-defendants may be admitted.
State v. Bolden,164 a 1903 case, recognized the general rule that
153. 4 J. WiGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1077 (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter referred to as
WIGMORE ).
154. Id.
155. State v. Melerine, 236 La. 930, 109 So.2d 471 (1959); State v. Courtney,
170 La. 314, 127 So. 735 (1930); State v. LaRocca, 168 La. 204, 121 So. 744
(1929); State v. Sheahan, 167 La. 1003, 120 So. 626 (1929); State v. Robi-
chaux, 165 La. 497, 115 So. 728 (1928).
156. State v. Brasseaux, 163 La. 686, 112 So. 650 (1927); State v. Bolden,
109 La. 484, 33 So. 571 (1903).
157. State v. Melerine, 236 La. 930, 109 So.2d 471 (1959); State v. Sheahan,
167 La. 1003, 120 So. 626 (1929); State v. Robichaux, 165 La. 497, 115 So.
728 (1928).
158. State v. Robichaux, 165 La. 497, 115 So. 728 (1928).
159. LA. R.S. 15:455 (1950); State v. Robichaux, 165 La. 497, 115 So. 728
(1928).
160. 4 WmoMRE § 1079 n.1.
161. State v. Skinner, 251 La. 300, 204 So.2d 370 (1967); 2 WIGMORM § 370.
162. See note 161 supra.
163. See note 161 supra; State v. Bolden, 109 La. 484, 33 So. 571 (.203);
State v. Buchanan, 35 La. Ann. 89 (1883).
164. 109 La. 484, 33 So. 571 (1903).
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a conspiracy must be established before declarations are admis-
sible. This court found an exception, however, in instances where
the conspiracy must be established by numerous isolated facts,
saying that "it is then permissible for the declarations and acts
of those thought to be in the conspiracy to be received subject
to be considered or rejected by the jury in case the conspiracy
be or not be established.' 1 5 Today's statute makes no such
exception. 1 6 In 1930 State v. Courtney'6 7 held that the order of
proof was discretionary with the judge and that such acts or
declarations might be received at any time during trial. The
statute grants no such discretion. In 1940 State v. Smith 1 8
recognized that "a foundation . . . must be laid, alieunde, by
proof sufficient in the opinion of the court to establish prima
facie the fact of conspiracy between the parties; the question
of such conspiracy is for the jury."' 69  (Emphasis added.)
Although the statute does not specify who is to determine the
prima facie establishment of the conspiracy, it seems probable
that Smith states the intended rule. Confessions are treated dif-
ferently from acts and declarations, and are admissible in evi-
dence only against the person making them.170
Evidence of a conspiracy is not limited to trials based on
an indictment for conspiracy. Such evidence, in practice, is also
admitted in trials not charging conspiracy but using the con-
spiracy theory to justify admission of statements of co-conspira-
tors. Where the line is to be drawn in admitting such evidence
is yet unclear, but such a practice undoubtedly compounds the
problems in the areas of admissibility of evidence and jury
charges.
Sidney M. Blitzer, Jr.
165. Id. at 487, 33 So. at 572.
166. Support for the exception in Bolden is found in 4 WIGMORE § 1079
(Supp. 1964).
167. 170 La. 314, 127 So. 735 (1930).
168. 194 La. 1015, 195 So. 523 (1940).
169. Id. at 1034, 195 So. at 530.
170. State v. Sims, 106 La. 453, 31 So. 71 (1901); State v. Robinson, 52 La.
Ann. 616, 27 So. 124 (1900); 4 WIGMORE § 1079.
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